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Abstract
Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed in finite quantum games. In this letter, we revisit this
fact using John Nash’s original approach of countering sets and Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
To the best of our knowledge, this mathematically formal approach has not been explored
before in the context of quantum games. We use this approach to draw conclusions about
Nash equilibrium states in quantum informational processes such as quantum computing and
quantum communication protocols.
1 Introduction
Any quantum physical process modeled as a non-cooperative game describes a quantum game of
the same type. The first instance of non-cooperative game theoretic modeling of quantum physical
processes appears to be the 1980 work of A. Blaquiere [1] where wave mechanics are considered as a
two player, zero-sum (strictly competitive) differential game and a minimax result is established for
certain quantum physical aspects. The more recent and more sustained game theoretic treatment
of quantum physical processes was initiated in 1999 with the work of D. Meyer [9]. Meyer’s work
only considered quantum computational and quantum algorithmic aspects of quantum physics as
games, making the game theoretic analysis of these quantum systems more straight forward using
finite-dimensional linear algebra instead of differential equations.
The year 1999 also saw the publication of the paper [3] by Eisert et al. in which a quantum
informational model for the informational component of two players games was considered. This
consideration was in the same spirit as the consideration of stochastic or randomization model
for information in a game which produces the so-called mixed game. The quantum informational
model of Eisert et al. produces a quantized game. The inspiration for considering extensions of
the informational aspect of games to larger domains comes from John Nash’s famous theorem [10]
which not only innovates the solution concept of non-cooperative games as an equilibrium problem
but, for the right kind of extension of the informational component of finite non-cooperative games,
also guarantees its existence. The relative simplicity of the proof of Nash’s theorem relies entirely
on Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [5].
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As for the motivation behind Meyer’s gaming the quantum approach, it lies in the fact that game
theory has been fruitfully applied to several disciplines with the goal of constrained optimization
of aspects of these disciplines, with economics and evolutionary biology being those that can be
argued to have benefited the most. Along similar lines, Meyer’s goal was to gain insights into
the constrained optimal behavior of quantum algorithms, such as when some components of the
algorithms were constrained to be classical.
It is important to note that even though both quantized games and gaming the quantum share
a common game theoretic scaffolding, the former is game theoretically meaningful while the latter
holds quantum physical meaning.
2 Non-cooperative games and Nash equilibrium
An n player, non-cooperative game in normal form is a function Γ
Γ :
n∏
i=1
Si −→ O (1)
with the additional feature of the notion of non-identical preferences over the elements of O for
every “player” of the game. The factor Si in the domain of Γ is the said to be the strategy set of
player i, and a play of Γ is a n-tuple of strategies, one per player, producing a payoff to each player
in terms of his preferences over the elements of O in the image of Γ. These preferences are typically
quantified numerically for the ease of calculation of the payoffs. In this numerical context, Γ can
be considered to be composed of component functions Γi which act as the payoff functions for each
player i.
A Nash equilibrium is a play of Γ in which every player employs a strategy that is a best reply,
with respects to his preferences over the outcomes, to the strategic choice of every other player.
In other words, unilateral deviation from a Nash equilibrium by any one player in the form of a
different choice of strategy will produce an outcome which is less preferred by that player than
before. Following Nash, we say that a play pi′ of Γ counters another play pi if Γi(pi
′) > Γi(pi) for all
players i, and that a self-countering play is an (Nash) equilibrium.
Let Cpi denote the set of all the plays of Γ that counter pi. Denote
∏n
i=1 Si by S for notational
convenience, and note that Cpi ⊂ S and therefore Cpi ∈ 2
S . Further note that the game Γ can be
factored as
Γ : S
ΓC−−→ 2S
E
−→ O (2)
where to any play p the map ΓC associates its countering set Cp via the payoff functions Γi. The
set-valued map ΓC may be viewed as a pre-processing stage where players seek out a self-countering
play, and if one is found, it is mapped to its corresponding outcome in O by the function E. The
condition for the existence of a self-countering play, and therefore of a Nash equilibrium, is that
ΓC have a fixed point, that is, an element p
∗ ∈ S such that p∗ ∈ ΓC(p
∗) = Cp∗.
2.1 The mixed extension and fixed points
In a general set-theoretic setting for non-cooperative games, the map ΓC may not have a fixed
point. Hence, not all non-cooperative games will have a Nash equilibrium. However, according to
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Nash’s theorem, when the Si are finite and the game is extended to its mixed version, that is, the
version in which randomization via probability distributions is allowed over the elements of all the
Si, as well as over the elements of O, then ΓC has at least one fixed point and therefore at least
one Nash equilibrium.
Formally, given a game Γ with finite Si for all i, its mixed version is the product function
Λ :
n∏
i=1
∆(Si) −→ ∆(O)
where ∆(Si) is the set of probability distributions over the i
th player’s strategy set Si, and the set
∆(O) is the set of probability distributions over the outcomes O. Payoffs are now calculated as
expected payoffs, that is, weighted averages of the values of Γi, for each player i, with respect to
probability distributions in ∆(O) that arise as the product of the plays of Λ. Denote the expected
payoff to player i by the function Λi. Also, note that Λ restricts to Γ. In such n-player games, at
least one Nash equilibrium play is guaranteed to exist as a fixed point of Λ via Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem.
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem: Let S ⊂ Rn be nonempty, bounded, closed, and convex, and let
F : S → 2S be an upper semi-continuous set-valued mapping such that F (s) is non-empty, closed,
and convex for all s ∈ S. Then there exists some s∗ ∈ S such that s∗ ∈ F (s∗).
To see this, make S =
∏n
i=1∆(Si). Then S ⊂ R
n and S is non-empty, bounded, and closed
because it is a finite product of finite non-empty sets. The set S is also convex because its the
convex hull of the elements of a finite set. Next, let Cp be the set of all plays of Λ that counter the
play p. Then Cp is non-empty, closed, and convex. Further, Cp ⊂ S and therefore Cp ∈ 2
S . Since
Λ is a game, it factors according to (2)
Λ : S
ΛC−−→ 2S
EΠ−−→ ∆(O)
where the map ΛC associates a play to its countering set via the payoff functions Λi. Since Λi are
all continuous, ΛC is continuous. Further, ΛC(s) is non-empty, closed, and convex for all s ∈ S (we
will establish the convexity of ΛC(s) below; the remaining conditions are also straightforward to
establish). Hence, Kakutani’s theorem applies and there exists an s∗ ∈ S that counters itself, that
is, s∗ ∈ ΛC(s
∗), and is therefore a Nash equilibrium. The function EΠ simply maps s
∗ to ∆(O) as
the product probability distribution from which the Nash equilibrium expected payoff is computed
for each player.
The convexity of the ΛC(s) = Cp is straight forward to show. Let q, r ∈ Cp. Then
Λi(q) ≥ Λi(p) and Λi(r) ≥ Λi(p) (3)
for all i. Now let 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 and consider the convex combination µq+ (1−µ)r which we will show
to be in Cp. First note that µq + (1− µ)r ∈ S because S is the product of the convex sets ∆(Si).
Next, since the Λi are all linear, and because of the inequalities in (3) and the restrictions on the
values of µ,
Λi(µq + (1− µ)r) = µΛi(q) + (1− µ)Λi(r) ≥ Λi(p)
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whereby µq + (1− µ)r ∈ Cp and Cp is convex.
Going back to the game Γ in (1) defined in the general set-theoretic setting, clearly Kakutani’s
theorem could be applicable to Γ if the conditions are right, such as when Γ is linear.
2.2 Generalzing Kakutani’s theorem
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem can be generalized to include subsets S of convex topological vector
spaces, as was done by Glicksberg in [4]. The following is a paraphrased but equivalent statement of
Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem (the term “linear space” in the original statement of Glicksberg’s
theorem is equivalent to the term vector space):
Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem: Let S be nonempty, bounded, closed, and convex subset of a
convex Hausdorff topological vector space and let Φ : S → 2S be an upper semi-continuous set-valued
mapping such that Φ(s) is non-empty, closed, and convex for all s ∈ S. Then there exists some
s∗ ∈ S such that s∗ ∈ Φ(s∗).
Using Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem, one can show that Nash equilibrium exists in games where
the strategy sets are infinite or possibly even uncountably infinite. In the next section, we contex-
tualize the guarantee of Nash equilibrium in quantum games via Glicksberg’s theorem.
3 Quantum games and Nash equilibrium
An n-player quantum game in normal form arises from (1) when one introduces quantum physically
relevant restrictions. We declare a quantum game to be any quantum physically meaningful function
Q :
n∏
i=1
Hi −→ H
where Hi is a complex Hilbert space acting as the set of strategies of player i, and H is the complex
Hilbert space of outcomes. By analogy with mixed game extensions, or more generally, stochastic
games where players’ strategies are probability distributions over the elements of some set, the
strategies of each player in a quantum game consist of quantum superpositions over the elements
of a set of observables in Hi. These strategic choices are then mapped by Q into elements of H
over which the players have non-identical preferences defined.
Set H =
∏n
i=1Hi and Ch ⊂ 2
H as the set of all countering plays of a play h of H. Then
Q : H
QC−−→ 2H
EQ
−−→ H
with the map QC taking a play to its countering set via payoff functions Qi for each i, and the
function EQ takes a self-countering play, if it exists, to the Nash equilibrium quantum superposition
in H. In the search for a guarantee of Nash equilibrium in a quantum game, Kakutani’s theorem
cannot be invoked as H 6⊂ Rn for any n. Hence, one looks to the more general Glicksberg’s theorem.
All except one component of a quantum game always meet the conditions of Glicksberg’s theorem.
The odd one out is the countering set Qc(h) = Ch (for any h) which is not necessarily convex.
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The convexity of the countering sets depends on the properties of the function Q, or the payoff
functions Qi more precisely. In particular, if these functions are linear or even semi-linear, then
convexity of the countering sets follows immediately from (3) with the Λi replaced with Qi. Hence,
to guarantee Nash equilibrium via fixed points in a quantum game, it is sufficient that the Qi all
be (semi) linear.
However, this is not the case generally, even in finite quantum games where each Hi and H are
assumed to have only finitely many observable states. In a finite quantum game, it is straightforward
to define non-identical preferences of the players over the finite number of observable states bj of
H, and then induce preferences over arbitrary quantum superpositions of these observable states
in H [6]. This allows one to define the payoff functions Qi in a quantum physically meaningful way
as the expected value of the game Q via the inner-product of the output q of Q and the observable
states bj of H,
Qi =
n∑
j=1
aj |〈q, bj〉|
2
,
where the aj are the eigenvalues of Q. Note the general quadratic nature of the payoff functions
Qi. Hence, finite quantum games don’t have fixed point guarantee for the the existence of Nash
equilibrium. Rather, a case by case study of quantum games is needed, or a mechanism design
approach using the inner-product on H as first proposed in [7].
For mixed extensions of finite quantum games or stochastic finite quantum games, the payoff
functions are defined via the trace operation and are therefore linear. Hence, the countering sets
will be convex in this case and Glicksberg theorem will apply [9], guaranteeing at least one Nash
equilibrium in the mixed finite quantum game.
We end this section with a discussion of quantum entanglement and where it fits in the context
of quantum games. There exist extensions of Γ beyond the mixed one known as “mediated commu-
nication”. Mediated communication corresponds to the situation where a probability distribution
in ∆(O) is desired so as to increase the value of the payoff functions, but which is not available
in the image of the mixed extension. This is achieved as follows. A neutral referee starts with a
non-product probability distribution P over the outcomes of a finite non-cooperative game Γ and
advises each player to engage in a play Π of Γ with respect to P . If each player agrees with the
referee’s advice after having evaluated his expected payoff with respect to P , then the play Π is
said to be a correlated equilibrium and the larger game with mediation is called a correlated game.
A more formal mathematical discussion of correlated games appears in [2]. Quantum entanglement
maybe considered as a form of mediated quantum communication and an extension of a quantum
game’s image in H so as to include non-factorisable quantum superpositions. Quantum entangle-
ment does not appear to offer any immediate insights into the existence of fixed points in correlated
quantum games, such as the linearity of the payoff functions.
4 Discussion
What does quantum game theory offer quantum information processing? For stochastic quantum
processes, when modeled as quantum games, Glickesburg theorem guarantees a Nash equilibrium
outcome which can be viewed as an optimal solution to an optimization problem with constraints
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defined over the outcomes of the process. For instance, quantum key distribution is a stochastic
quantum process and can be cast as stochastic quantum game where a coalition of players at-
tempting to share an electronic key (Alice and Bob) engage in a non-cooperative way with the
eavesdropper (Eve). Alice and Bob for instance want to amplify privacy whereas Eve does not, and
in fact may want to decrease it. Or, Alice and Bob may wish to reconcile the information in such
protocols whereas Eve would not want to. If the Alice and Bob coalition and Eve try to achieve
their respective outcomes via random quantum processes, then Glickesburg theorem will guarantee
an optimal solution, with respect to the prefence constraints, in the form of a Nash equilibrium.
In a quantum computational setting, things can be said to be more interesting as Nash equi-
librium are not guaranteed. In this setting, quantum search algorithms or state amplification algo-
rithms can be viewed as zero-sum games between a player and Nature. The item being searched
for is the most preferred item of the player with control over one qubit, while Nature, with her
(n − 1) qubits prefers anything but that. Which quantum search algorithms have a fixed point
guaranteed Nash equilibrium? Recently, Yoder et al. [11] presented a quantum search algorithm
for finding fixed points. It would be interesting to explore whether any connections exist between
such algorithms and fixed points of quantum games.
Finally, we point out that while zero-sum quantum games (stochastic or otherwise) may ap-
pear to find more applications in quantum information processing, more general quantum game
models are also possible for quantum information processing. An example of a quantum Prison-
ers Dilemma’s application to quantum computing can be found in [8]. It would be correct to say
that applications of non-zero sum quantum games to quantum information processing is an area of
scientific query yet to be fully explored.
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